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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of family control on firm performance on the 
OMX60 during the period 2008-2012. The study is inspired by Anderson and Reeb (2003) an 
Oreland (2007). The results show evidence of a positive effect on Return on assets for founding 
family-firms but no evidence of a family-effect on Tobin’s Q and family-effect by family-firms 
on ROA. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There are mixed opinions regarding family control of public firms. Many family firms are highly 
regarded because many of the large corporations have thrived under the same family for decades 
(Barontini and Caprio, 2006). Family firms are a successful concept and many of the large firms 
have started as family owned corporations. One of the more famous family empires in Sweden is 
the Wallenberg family with a large influence on several of the Swedish firms. Wallenberg is one 
of Sweden's oldest family group and the empire is on its fifth generation (Fagerfjäll, 2007). This 
type of long-term commitment is something that many associate with family control but also the 
devotion that many families have in the firms that they invest in. But there have been some 
discussions that families and other shareholders may have different interests that could prevent 
value accumulation and growth in the company (Barontini and Caprio, 2006). 
  
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the possible differences in firm performance 
between family-controlled firms and non-family controlled firms in Sweden. The result could 
have an impact on decisions within the firms regarding family control.  
  
To distinguish this paper from earlier work this thesis will focus on firms in the Swedish market. 
To find evidence of differences the collection of data will be from Swedish firms in the “large 
cap” category on the OMX. Previous studies have been made on this topic, focusing on the North 
American market and the European market. Barontini and Caprio (2006) have shown that family 
controlled firms do not have any negative affect the firm performance as previous studies have 
concluded. The study by Barontini and Caprio (2006) is based on data from 675 publicly traded 
firms across Europe. Andersson and Reeb (2003) discuss the result of a slightly positive effect in 
performance between family controlled firms and non-family controlled firms in their study 
based on the North American market.  
 
Another earlier study that has been focusing on family controlled firms is Villalonga and Amith 
(2006) that finds that the family owned firms only create value if the founder remains in the firm 
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as the CEO. The value created by the family-effect is though destroyed when the descendants 
takes over. Oreland (2007) on the other hand seems to find that family-firms, in his study on the 
Swedish market, have worse performance in comparison to non-family firms. 
 
Previous articles have contradictory conclusions that could imply that factors beyond family 
control might be involved, eg. structural differences between markets and regions. Dyer (2006) 
verify the contradictory conclusions by comparing nine studies that examine firm performance 
and family control on firms across Europe and the USA. Dyer (2006) argues that one cause of 
the difference between results in previous studies is that the studies fail to determine the family 
effect from other variables. 
  
To examine if there are a significant “family-effect” on firm performance on the Swedish market 
we will look at the following questions; Do firms with family ownership majority have an effect 
on firm performance? What measure is a good tool for detecting the effect of performance in 
family firms?  
 
2. Theory  
2.1 Family firms and performance 
There are many theories about the positive and negative perspective of performance in family-
firms. Dyer (2006) presents family factors affecting high versus low firm performance where the 
principal-agency theory has a central role (see table 1). If the agents (managers) and the principal 
(owners) have different goals the agent costs will be severe, although this is not unique for 
family firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss that family firms are likely to have lower 
agency cost because the owners and the managers in family firms often are the same. The agency 
costs are the costs of the monitoring of the agents by the principals, and they increase when the 
firm grows. Since the need of monitoring by the owner is not an issue when owner and manager 
are the same person, the agency costs will not be a problem in founder-led firms. On the other 
hand, the family control of the manager could be a reason for higher, or equally high, agency 
costs as non-family firms due to the differences in the interest of family members in managerial 
positions (Schultze et al, 2001). 
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Table 1: Family factors affecting firm performance 
 
Picture from Dyer (2006) p. 259 
 
Schulze et al (2001) mentions that parents altruism, treating people for who they are and not for 
what they do, aswell can result in that they are generous to their children despite that they might 
be insufficient or incompetence which could result in deterioration in the firm's value-added. 
Family control can also create problems with “free-rider family members” as a result of the 
parents altruism to their family members (Schulze et al 2001). This result is also supported by 
Villalonga and Amit (2004) where the findings from 508 firms from Fortune 500 claims that 
second generation family-leaders destroy firm value. Schulze et al (2001) are not only presenting 
the negative effects of parent’s altruism, the family control might also have a positive effect 
where altruism will minimize the agency costs. 
 
The principal-agent theory is not unique for family-firms. Non-family firms can aswell be 
affected by the positive and negative impacts of management control. Other aspects affecting the 
family-firm performance despite the agency theory is the aspect of long-term investment in 
family firms to be able to support the next generations in the family (Gudmunsson et al. 1999). 
Another factor to take into account is the value of reputation of the family and the family firm 
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where, especially in the service industry, the reputation of a family name positively influences 
costumers and suppliers (Dyer 2006).  
 
To continue the aspect of manager control, Burkart et al (2003) present a model of managerial 
succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder where the founder decides (1) between 
hiring a professional manager or leaving management to its family and (2) on what fraction of 
the company to float on the stock exchange. The two paradigms of corporate governance are 
combined in the single model of managerial succession: the Anglo-Saxon paradigm of the 
conflict between the shareholders and the manager and the second paradigm of the conflict 
between large and small shareholders. The background of the decision of the founder is 
according to Burkart et al (2003) shaped by the degree of legal protection of minority 
shareholders and shows an implication of how the founder should decide optimal succession and 
ownership structure. When the legal protection of minority shareholders is strong, the optimal 
solution for the founder is to hire the best professional manager and sell off the entire firm in the 
stock market due to minimization of the agency conflict between the manager and small minority 
shareholders. With intermediate protection of minority shareholders, the founder should still hire 
a professional manager, but due to the intermediate protection of minority shareholders the 
founder or its descendants must stay on as large shareholders to monitor the manager. When the 
protection of minority shareholders is weak, the agency problems are too severe to allow for 
separation of ownership and management and in this case the founding family must stay and run 
the firm. 
 
3.Literature Review 
3.1 Family firm 
The concept of family firms is somewhat difficult to define. The question is which firms that 
should be included in the group of family firms. There is some divergences opinion about what a 
family-firm really is. Some refer to family firms as firms where the largest shareholder is one of 
the family members in the founding family. Researchers claim that the founding family needs to 
possess one or more board seats and/or the position as CEO. As Andersson & Reeb (2003) 
discuss, the problem is particularly substantial for older firms where there is more likely for 
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distant relatives to have the active positions in the firms. It is hard to identify relatives in second 
or even third generations that might not even carry the same surname as the founder or his or 
hers closest family members. 
 
3.2 Earlier empirical studies 
Barontini and Caprio (2006) investigate the relation between family control and ownership 
structure. The data is collected from 675 large publicly traded firms from 11 countries from 
Continental Europe over the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. Their evidence indicate a positive 
relationship between family control, market valuation and operating performance. The analysis 
by Barontini and Caprio (2006) take into account the “family effect” by the variables family firm 
and ownership variables where a firm is considered a family-controlled family firm if a family 
controls more than 51% of direct voting rights or controls more than twice the direct voting 
rights of the second largest shareholder. The dependant variables measuring firm performance 
and firm valuation is Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). Their result does not imply a global 
negative effect of family control, rather a positive association of family control with market 
valuation and operating performance. If the founder still is in a controlling position the family-
effect in firms in Continental Europe is positive. However, they do not find evidence that 
descendant-controlled firms underperform non-family firms.  
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) investigate the relation between founding-family ownership and firm 
performance from a sample of 403 firms from S&P 500 in 1992 to 1999. Firm performance is 
measured by Tobin’s Q, Return on assets (ROA) and Return on equity (ROE) and the definition 
of family firm is that the family continues to have equity ownership stake in firm, family 
possesses board seats and the founding CEO or its descendent is still the acting CEO (Anderson 
and Reeb 2003). The findings show that family firms outperform non-family firms in both ROA 
and Tobin’s Q.  
 
Oreland (2007) examine the relationship between family control and firm performance on 144 
Swedish public listed companies over the years 1985-2000. Taking into account the impact of 
family control of the CEO position as well as family controlled and founder controlled owner 
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Oreland (2007) show that both family firms and founder family firms perform worse than firms 
with dispersed ownership.  
 
Oreland (2007) measures firm performance by Tobin's Q and uses control variables in the form 
of firm characteristics and the independent variables ROA, size, age, leverage, sales/assets, PPE 
(property, plant and equipment)/assets and CAPEX (capital expenditures)/assets in the 
regression. It is important to have in mind that even if ROA often is used as an alternative 
measure of performance the ownership might affect Tobin´s q through ROA (Oreland, 2007). 
This can result in difficulties to find the true relationship between the ownership and Tobin´s q. 
The definition of a family firm according to Oreland (2007) is divided into family controlled 
firms and founder-family controlled firms. Family controlled firms are firms where an individual 
or group of individuals controls > 25 percent of the firm. Firms controlled by founder-families 
are firms where the controlling owner(s) are either the founder or relatives to the founder (Ibid).   
 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) argues that a firm considered a family firm has to fulfil the criteria 
of having members of the family as officer, director or a shareholder in the firm. They find a 
higher Tobin’s Q in family owned firms but when the descendant takes over the managing of the 
firm the firm value gets destroyed. Villalonga and Amit (2006) measure firm value by Tobin’s Q 
for their sample collected from the firm-year data of 508 firms from Fortune 500 1994-2000.  
 
These four studies represent the background for our study, but to further acknowledge the issue 
of the difficulties in defining a family-firm and choose the correct firm performance 
measurement we have also been reviewing Dyer (2006). Dyer (2006) analyse the “family effect” 
on firm performance, as several studies regarding family firm performance have found mixed 
results on firm performance considered the effect of family firms. The mixed results on firm 
performance are according to Dyer (2006) a result of differences in the measurements regarding 
both the firm performance and family firm. Table 1 shows us an overview of the earlier studies 
we have based our study on and it show us the difference in findings, definition of family-firms 
and performance/valuation measurements.  
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Table 2: Earlier studies 
Citation Definition 
family firm 
Performance/ 
valuation measure 
Sample Sample 
criteria 
Findings 
Anderson 
and Reeb 
(2003) 
Family firm 
criteria: (1) the 
family continues 
to have an equity 
ownership stake 
in firm; (2) family 
possesses board 
seats; (3) 
founding CEO or 
its descendant is 
the acting CEO. 
1. Tobin’s Q 
2. Return on 
assets (ROA) 
3. Return on 
equity 
403 firms 
taken from 
S&P 500. 
Firms from 
1992-1999 
S&P 500 
firms, 
excluding 
banks and 
public 
utilities 
Family firms 
have higher 
Tobin’s Q 
and return on 
assets.  
Barontini 
and Caprio 
(2006) 
Family controlled 
firm if a family 
controls more 
than 51% of 
direct voting 
rights or control 
more than double 
the direct voting 
rights of the 
second largest 
shareholder. 
1. Tobin’s Q 
2. Return on 
assets (ROA) 
675 firms 
from 11 
countries 
from 
Continental 
Europe. 
Time period 
1999-2001. 
Non-
financial and 
non-
regulated 
firms with 
assets worth 
more than 
€300 in 
1999 from 
11 countries.  
Family 
controlled 
firms 
perform 
slightly more 
positive than 
non-family 
firms.  
Oreland 
(2007) 
Family controlled 
firm if an 
individual or 
group controls 
>25%. Founder 
family controlled 
firm if controlling 
owner(s) are the 
founder or its 
relatives.  
Tobin’s Q 
 
144 
Swedish 
public listed 
firms. Time 
period 
1985-2000.  
144 large 
non-
financial 
firms listed 
on the 
Stockholm 
Stock 
Exchange 
from 1985-
2000.  
Family 
controlled 
firms 
perform 
worse than 
non-family 
firms.  
Villalonga 
and Amit 
(2004) 
The founder or a 
member of its 
family by either 
blood or marrage 
is an officer, a 
director, or a  
stockholder.  
Tobin’s Q 
 
508 firms 
from 
Fortune 500  
during the 
years 1994-
2000. 
Fortune 500 
firms from 
1994-2000. 
Family 
owned firms 
have higher 
Tobin’s Q 
but second-
generation 
family 
leaders 
destroy firm 
value.  
Table 1 is an overview of earlier studies used as theory in this study.  
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3.3 Firm performance 
Most of the studies use ROA and Tobin’s Q as firm performance measurements. Therefore the 
parameters in this study will follow the same model as Oreland (2007), who also made his study 
on the Swedish market, but also include ROA as a measurement for firm performance.  
3.3.1 Tobin´s Q 
Tobin´s Q is the ratio between the total market value and total asset value for a firm. This 
variable implies that the ratio between the total market value and the total asset value of the firm 
will tend towards a value of one in the long run. Although it has been observed that the value can 
differ substantially from one under long periods of time. The theory behind Tobin’s Q is that 
many analysts believe that the market value of a firm cannot outstand the replacement cost, 
because in that case investors would try to replace the firm. Similar firms on the market will 
drive down the market value of the firm to market equilibrium because of the competitive 
pressure. The advantage of Tobin’s Q compared to other firm performance measurements is that 
Tobin’s Q is based on the market value that measure current values of a firms assets and 
indebtedness’s. Another positive factor by using a measure based on a firms market value in 
comparison to the book value is that assets like those of intellectual properties is included in the 
market value. (Bodie et al., 2009, p.765). 
 
When Tobin’s Q is greater than one the value of installed capital in the existing firm exceeds the 
cost of repurchasing it new and start a new firm from scratch (Burda & Wyplosz 2012, p.195). 
This would imply that the firms should take the chance to invest in more capital to increase the 
firm’s market value. But giving the declining of marginal productivity the new investments in 
capital reduces the return on capital over time and therefore Tobin’s Q will decline over time. 
The model does though have some restrictions regarding public utilities and banks where there 
are some risk of government regulations that could affect the firm performance and therefore the 
result of Tobin’s Q (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).   
3.3.2 Return on assets (ROA) 
Return on total assets (ROA) measures the profitability for all contribution of capital that is 
measured by earnings before taxes, depreciation, interest and amortization divided by the total 
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assets of the firm (Bodie et al. 2009, p.765). If ROA exceeds the debt-equity ratio the firms earn 
more than it pays to their creditors. ROA is measured as the book value and some problems with 
those types of measurements is, as discussed earlier, that it not measurements the current value 
of the firm’s assets and liabilities (Bodie et al. 2009, p.812). Another mentionable aspect is that 
ROA does not take into account the value that the firm possesses in intellectual properties like 
strong firm name or patent and intern research of development.  
4. Method 
4.1 Hypotheses  
The previous studies by Anderson and Reeb (2003), Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Villalonga 
and Amit (2004) have shown a positive family-effect on firm performance while the family-
effect in Oreland (2007) is negative. Since the majority of the previous studies have shown a 
positive effect on firm performance, our hypotheses will test the positive “family-effect” on firm 
performance by measuring Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
 
The first hypothesis will test the family-effect on firm performance by measuring Tobin’s Q and 
ROA where family-effect is the effect of family firms; 
                                                               
 
The second hypothesis will test the family-effect on firm performance when the family firm 
controls the CEO. Firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA; 
                                                                     
                           
 
The third hypothesis tests the founding-family effect on firm performance by measuring Tobin’s 
Q and ROA; 
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The fourth hypothesis will test the founding-family effect on firm performance when the 
founding-family firm controls the CEO; 
                                                                        
                           
 
 4.2 Variables  
To define the structure of the ownership in the sample the degree of shareholder’s control over 
the firm is used. If the major shareholder is a single family or individual and control > 25 % of 
the voting rights or > 25 % of the capital, the firm is considered to be a family controlled firm 
(Oreland 2007). If the founder-family still are shareholders in the firm and possesses board seats 
the firm is considered to be a founder-family firm (Andersson and Reeb 2003). To control if the 
founder-family still have an equity ownership in the firm we use the book “Ägarna och makten i 
Sveriges Börsföretag” (Fristedt et al, 2009) that presents the 25 largest shareholders in public 
listed firms. We have therefore decided to only take account for the 25 largest shareholders when 
defining the founder-family firms.  
 
Since the argument regarding having family members on the board or as CEO have been 
mentioned in several earlier studies (Andersson and Reeb (2003), Oreland (2007)) we have 
decided to take this factor in to account. The control of the firm manager is an especially 
important factor to consider, since the CEO is making the operative decisions and therefore 
almost have ultimate control over the firm (Oreland 2007). We are therefore also going to 
consider the effect of having a family or founding-family controlled CEO. In our sample only 
one firm, Hennes & Mauritz, controls the CEO. Therefore we can not control for the effect of 
having a family-controlled CEO, but will present the regression results in appendix.  
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Table 3: Family structure 
Family structure N       Percentage  
Family firm 18 45% 
Founding-family firm 9 23% 
Non founder family or family 
firm 
20 50% 
Family CEO 1 3% 
Founder family CEO 1 3% 
Table 2 displays the quantity and percentage of firms in different family structures. The sample 
total consists of 200 firm-year observations, from 2008 to 2012. To be a family firm, the 
individual or family must have >25% of the shares or votes. To be a founding-family firm, the 
founder or its family must be an equity shareholder among the largest 25 shareholders and have 
board seat(s). Non-founder family or non-family firm is the firms not in the family-firm and 
founding-family firm groups. Family CEO is where the controlling family- or founder-family 
firm controls the position as CEO in the firm.     
4.3 Sample and data collection 
The sample firms used in this study are collected from OMX 60, which contains the 60 most 
traded shares in Sweden listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. We have collected data from 
the firms contained in the OMX 60 under a five-year period, from 2008 to 2012.  
 
Ten (10) firms with residence outside Sweden are excluded from the sample. Four (4) public 
utilities and banks are also excluded as well as three (3) investment firms, since according to 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) the government regulations could affect the firm performance. In the 
sample of OMX60 there are three firms that have both their A and B shares among the 60 most 
traded and therefore there are a total of 57 firms in the OMX60. We then have a total of twenty 
(20) excluded firms which results in forty (40) firms remaining in our sample and a total of 200 
observations (see table 4). 
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Table 4: Overview firms in the sample from OMX60 
 Firms in OMX 60     
1 Alfa Laval 30 SCANIA  
2 Arcam 31 Securitas  
3 Assa Abloy  32 Skanska  
4 Atlas Copco 33 SKF  
5 Axis 34 SSAB 
6 Betsson  35 Swedish Match 
7 Boliden 36 Tele 2  
8 Castellum 37 TeliaSonera 
9 Electrolux  38 Trelleborg  
10 Elekta  39 Volvo  
11 Ericsson  40 Husqvarna  
12 Fabege 41 ABB Ltd* 
13 Fingerprint Cards  42 AstraZeneca* 
14 Getinge  43 Autoliv SDB* 
15 Hennes & Mauritz  44 SEB ** 
16 Hexagon  45 Ica Gruppen* 
17 Hexpol 46 Industrivärden ** 
18 Holmen  47 Investor ** 
19 Intrum Justitia 48 Kinnevik * 
20 JM 49 Lundin Mining Corporation SDB* 
21 Lundin Petrolium 50 Millicom Int. Cellular SDB* 
22 Meda  51 Nokia Oyj* 
23 Modern Times Group  52 Nordea Bank** 
24 NCC  53 Oriflame, SDB* 
25 Precise Biometrics 54 Stora Enso R* 
26 Raos  55 Sv. Handelsbanken ** 
27 SAAB  56 Swedbank ** 
28 Sandvik 57 Swedish Orphan Biovitrum* 
29 SCA    
    
Table 4 displays the firms in the sample form the OMX60. *Dismissed, foreign residence, 
**Dismissed, Financial institutions 
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4.4 Data 
The data used is key performance indicators and financial ratios collected from Orbis. For two of 
the firms the information regarding number of outstanding shares and the share price were 
missing in the Orbis database and therefore the data were collected from Data Stream. The data 
includes information about the largest capital owners and the one with the largest voting rights of 
the firms. The secondary data also includes information about the board members, the CEO and 
the founder of the firms. This data is collected from “Ägarna och makten i Sveriges Börsföretag” 
(Fristedt et al, 2009) and the firm’s own Internet pages.                
 4.5 Implementation 
The first step of the implementation was to collect the data needed from OMX60; firm 
performance and firm valuation measurements from the annual reports and through the databases 
Orbis and Datastream. Data on ownership structure about family, founder-family, founder-CEO 
and family-CEO where obtained from the book “Ägarna och makten i Sveriges Börsföretag” 
(Fristedt et al, 2009) and the webpages of respective firm. The firms were also categorised in 
industries by GICS (the Global Industry Classification Standard). The firm category named 
“Industrials” is the one category with the most observations. There for this is category that is 
used in the regressions.  
 
Table 5: Classification of the firms in industries 
Industry classification 
(GICS) 
              N Family- 
firms 
Founding- 
family- 
firms 
Family 
CEO/ 
Founding 
CEO 
Non- 
founding / 
Non-family 
Firms 
1. Industrials 16 8 
 
2 0 7 
2. Information 
Technology 
2 0 1 0 1 
3. Consumer Staples   3 2 2 1 1 
4. Materials 4 2 2 0 2 
5. Financials 5 1 1 0 4 
6. Consumer 
Discretionary 
4 2 0 0 2 
7. Health Care 3 1 1 0 2 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Industry classification 
(GICS) 
              N Family- 
firms 
Founding- 
family- 
firms 
Family 
CEO/ 
Founding 
CEO 
Non- 
founding / 
Non-family 
Firms 
8. Energy 1 1 0 0 0 
9. Telecommunication 
Services 
2 1 0 0 1 
10. Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 40 18 9 1 20 
The table displays the classifications of the firms into 10 different industries according to the 
GICS (the Global Industry Classification Standard). The sample consists of 40 firms from 
OMX60 with 200 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2012. The firms are divided into family-
firms, founding-family firms, family-CEO, founding-family CEO and non-founding/non-family 
firm. To be a family firm, the individual or family must have >25% of the shares or votes. To be 
a founding-family firm, the founder or its family must be an equity shareholder among the 
largest 25 shareholders and have board seat(s). Non-founder family or non-family firm is the 
firms not in the family-firm and founding-family firm groups. Family CEO is where the 
controlling family- or founder-family firm controls the position as CEO in the firm.     
 
4.6 The chosen Variables and their definition                  
Following is an overview and short description of the variables used in the study. 
Dependent variables  
                        (   )  
       (                                                           )
            
  (                 ) 
 
            
                         
                 
  (Andersson and Reeb 2003 p.1310) 
Main Independent variables 
 Family firm – A single family or individual have > 25% of the voting rights or own > 
25% of the capital. Measured by a dummy variable were (1) is a family-firm and (0) is a 
non-family firm. 
 Family CEO - A single family or individual that have > 25% of the voting rights or own 
25% of the capital has the position as CEO in the firm. Measured by a dummy variable 
were (1) is family CEO positions and (0) is a non-family CEO position. 
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 Founder-family firm - The founding family are among the 25 largest shareholders in the 
firm and possesses board seat(s). Measured by a dummy variable were (1) is founder-
family firm and (0) is a non-founder family firm. 
 Founder-family CEO - The founder or its descendant have the position as CEO in the 
firm. Measured by a dummy variable were (1) is a founder-family CEO position and (0) 
is a non-founder family CEO position. 
Control variables 
 Leverage (debt-equity ratio) 
          
                   
 
● Industry – Classification of the firms according to GICS.  
● Ln(size) - The natural logarithm of total assets of the firm.  
● Return on total assets – when using lnTobin’s- Q as depending variable. 
4.7 Regressions 
We will run eight regressions, four with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable and four with ROA 
as the dependent variable. We will measure the effect of the following four variables on Tobin’s 
Q and ROA in four different regressions; (1) family firm, (2) founder family firm, (3) family 
firms with a family CEO, (4) founder family firms with a founder family CEO. The method used 
is OLS regression with cluster. We use cluster standard errors on firms. The cluster is used to 
make the observations within the cluster more similar to each other than observations within 
different clusters (Wooldridge, 2013, p.403-404). In our case this means that the yearly 
observations regarding each firm are tied to each other in a way.        
 
We test the variables in the regressions for multicollinearity this is done to see if any of our 
variables are correlated with each other. The multicollinearity test is of certain interest because if 
we have collinearity between any of the variables the coefficient estimates of the OLS 
regressions may change unpredictably in response to small changes in the model or data 
(Wooldridge, 2013, p.262).  
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5. Empirical results 
 
The empirical results is presented by the four regressions made; Tobin’s Q with family-firm and 
founder-family firm and ROA with family-firm and founder-family firm. We begin with an 
overview of the mean, standard deviation, min- and max values of the variables used in the tests. 
The tests will be presented in table 6-11.  
 
Table 6: Mean, standard deviations, min- and max values 
Variable      Obs   Mean Std. Dev.      Min    Max 
ROA  199 0,12297 0,177185 -1,4157 0,603105 
Tobin’s Q 200 1,38155 1,534872 0,08541 10,47839 
Liability 200 0,58074 0,161418 0,09013 1,142718 
Total debt 200 4642210 6554520 1234,43 3,90E+07 
ln Size 200 14,9148 1,951093 8,37899 17,76826 
Table 6 continues      
Share price 200 15,3598 10,19782 0,10242 66,31835 
Market value 200 7247864 1,22E+07 7830,33 1,16E+08 
Table 6 shows the mean, standard deviations, min- and max value of the variables used in the 
tests. The sample consists 200 firm-year observations from 2008-2012 from 40 firms from the 
OMX60. One observation is missing when calculating ROA and EBITDA where we have used 
199 observations.  
5.1 Test 1: Tobin’s q and family firm 
The correlation matrix in table 1.1 in appendix shows no evidence for high correlation between 
the variables in the regression.  
Table 7: Regression analysis Tobin’s Q and family firm 
Linear regression: lnTobin´s q, Fam, Liability, lnSize, ROA, y11, y10, y09, y08, industry 1 (cluster) 
Number of obs=199 
F ( 9, 39) = 17,71 
Prob> F =  0,0000 
R-squared = 0,4398  
 
lnTobin’s Q Coef. T           
Fam -0,1402817 -0,76  
Liability -1,141291 -1,04  
lnSize -0,2198943 -2,98***  
ROA 1,528687 1,48  
y11 -0,088674 -1,31  
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Table 7 continues   
y10 0,0790124 1,28  
y09 -0,2599774 -2,64**  
y08 -0,7103298 -4,75***  
Industry 1 -0,0239946 -0,13  
cons 3,920084 5,25  
Table 7 show the OLS regression analysis with cluster on firmcode made in Stata with lnTobin’s 
Q, family, liability, lnsize, ROA, year dummys 2008-2011 and industry-dummy for industry 1 
(“Industrials”). The sample consists 199 firm-year observations from 2008-2012.  Family is a 
dummy variable measuring if the firm is a family firm, 1 if a family or individual own >25% of 
the votes or shares. ROA is Return on assets, liability is calculated by total debt divided by total 
assets and lnsize is the natural logarithm of the total asset of the firm. There are 5 year-dummy 
variables, 2008-2012 and 2012 is excluded in the regression. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively, for double-sided t-test.   
 
With a R-square of 0,4398, 43,98 % of the dependent variable (ln)Tobin’s Q in the regression is 
described by the independent variables. The variable that is the most interesting in the regression 
is family firm but we can not see significance for it and therefore we can not say with certainty 
that family have an effect on firms market value measured by (ln)Tobin’s Q. We can see that the 
variable of (ln)size are significant with a t value of -2,98 at a significance level of at least  1%, 
meaning that a 1% increase of firms size would lead to a decrease of the firms value of Tobin’s 
Q with 0,22%. The rest of the variable in the regression do not have any significance with an 
exception of the year dummy of 2009 and 2008. The year dummy 2009 is significant on 5% level 
with a t-value of -2,64 this means that the dummy 2009 has a negative effect on (ln)Tobins Q 
compared with the year of 2012 that is representing the base group. The year dummy 2008 is 
significant on the 1% level with a t-value of -4,75 and has a negative effect compared to the base 
year 2012 wish is excluded in the regression, meaning that the value of Tobin´s Q was 
considerably lower especially in the years of 2008 but also for the year of 2009 compared to 
2012. 
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5.2 Test 2: Tobin’s q and founder family firm 
The correlation matrix in table 1.2 in appendix shows no evidence for high correlation between 
the variables in the regression.  
Table 8: Regression analysis Tobin’s Q and family firm 
Linear regression lnTobin´s Q, Founding fam, Liability, lnSize, ROA, y11, y10, y09, y08, industry 1 
(cluster) 
Number of obs=199 
F ( 9, 39) = 17,20 
Prob> F =  0,0000 
R-squared = 0,4399 
lnTobin´s Q Coef.    t     
Founding fam 0,1728902 0,59     
Liability -1,122279 -0,98     
lnSize -0,2205699 -2,93***      
ROA 1,345996 1,33     
y11 -0,089258 -1,39     
y10 0,076055 1,31     
y09 -0,2515599 -2,63**     
y08 -0,7088624 -4,8***     
Industry 1 -0,0250665 -0,12     
cons 3,837846 5,35     
Table 9 show the OLS regression analysis with cluster on firmcode made in Stata with lnTobin’s 
Q, founding-family, liability, lnsize, ROA, year dummys 2008-2011 and industry-dummy for 
industry 1 (“Industrials”). Founding-Family is a dummy variable measuring if the firm is a 
family firm if the founder or its family are among the 25 largest shareholders and possesses 
board seat(s). The sample consists 199 firm-year observations from 2008-2012. There are 5 
year-dummy variables, 2008-2012 and 2012 is excluded in the regression. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively, for double-sided t-test.    
 
In table 9 above we can not see any significance between founding family and (ln)Tobin’s Q 
because of a t-value of 0,59. In this regression we can see that (ln)size is significant with a t-
value of -2,93 at least at 1% significant level, meaning that a 1% increase of firms size would 
lead to a decrease of the firms Tobin’s Q with 0,22%. The other independent variables in the 
regression do not have any significance with the exception of the year dummy of 2009 and 2008. 
The year dummy 2009 is significant on 5% level and the year dummy 2008 is significant on the 
1% level and has a negative effect compared to the base year 2012 wish is excluded in the 
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regression. This result implies that the value of Tobin’s Q was considerably lower especially in 
the years of 2008 but also for the year of 2009 compared to 2012 
5.3 Test 3: ROA and family 
The correlation matrix in table 1.3 in appendix shows no evidence for high correlation between 
the variables in the regression.  
 
Table 10: Regression analysis ROA and family 
Linear regression ROA, Fam, Liability, lnSize, y11, y10, y09, y08, industry 1 (cluster) 
Number of obs=199 
F ( 8, 39) = 4,32 
Prob> F =  0,0009 
R-squared = 0,2066 
    ROA Coef.     t 
Fam 0,0432258    1,56 
Liability -0,0427958   -0,29 
lnSize 0,0278569    1,12 
y11 0,0100617    0,57 
y10 0,0018249    0,12 
y09 0,053669    3,15*** 
y08 0,0227557    0,74 
Industry 1 -0,0946189   -2,38** 
cons -0,269562   -0,78 
Table 10 show the OLS regression analysis with cluster on firmcode made in Stata with ROA, 
family, liability, lnsize, ROA, year dummys 2008-2011 and industry-dummy for industry 1 
(“Insdustrials”). The sample consists 199 firm-year observations from 2008-2012. Family is a 
dummy variable measuring if the firm is a family firm, 1 if a family or individual own >25% of 
the votes or shares. ROA is Return on assets, liability is calculated by total debt divided by total 
assets and lnsize is the natural logarithm of the total asset of the firm. There are 5 year-dummy 
variables, 2008-2012 and 2012 is excluded in the regression. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively, for double-sided t-test.   
 
The result of the OLS regression with cluster for ROA and family in table 10 has an R-square of 
0.2066 which implies that the independent variables in the regression explains 20,66% of the 
variation in ROA. Our family variable is not significant and therefore we cannot say with 
certainty that family has an effect on ROA. This is also the case for liability, size and the year 
dummies 2011, 2010 and 2008. The year dummy 2009 is significant on 1% significance level 
and has a positive effect compared to the base year 2012 wish is excluded in the regression, 
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meaning that the value of ROA was higher in the years of 2009 compared to 2012. The industry 
dummy “industry 1” is significant at the 5% significance level and has a negative effect on ROA 
compared to the other nine industries, with a coefficient of -0.095 this implies that the firms in 
the industry 1 had a lower value of their ROA compared to the firms in the other 9 industries. 
5.4 Test 4: ROA and founder family 
The correlation matrix in table 1.4 in appendix shows no evidence for high correlation between 
the variables in the regression.  
Table 11: Regression analysis ROA and founder family 
Linear regression ROA, Founding family, Liability, lnSize, y11, y10, y09, y08, industry 1 (cluster) 
Number of obs=199 
F ( 8, 39) = 4,30 
Prob> F =  0,0009 
R-squared = 0,2446 
       ROA Coef.       t 
Found fam 0,1026704      2,17** 
Liability -0,0417116     -0,3 
lnSize 0,0304877      1,22 
y11 0,0101114      0,58 
y10 0,0023126      0,15 
y09 0,0543663      3,23*** 
y08 0,0236024      0,78 
industry 1 -0,072319     -2,05** 
cons -0,3197294     -0,93 
Table 11 show the OLS regression analysis with cluster on firmcode made in Stata ROA, 
founder-family, liability, lnsize, ROA, year dummys 2008-2011 and industry-dummy for industry 
1 (“Insdustrials”). Founding-Family is a dummy variable measuring if the firm is a family firm if 
the founder or its family are among the 25 largest shareholders and possesses board seat(s). 
There are 5 year-dummy variables, 2008-2012 and 2012 is excluded in the regression. The 
sample consists 199 firm-year observations from 2008-2012. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively, for double-sided t-test.   
 
The result by the OLS regression with firm cluster for ROA and founder family in table 11 has 
an R-square of 0.2446 which implies that the independent variables in the regression explains 
24,46% of the variations in ROA. Our founder family variable is significant at least on the 5% 
significance level with a t-value of 2.17 and therefore the variable founder family has a positive 
effect on ROA, meaning that if our founder family variable increasing with 1 unit, ROA would 
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increase by 0,102 unit. The variables liability, size and the year dummies 2011, 2010 and 2008 
are not significant. The year dummy 2009 is significant on a 1% significance level and has a 
positive effect with a coefficient of 0.054 compared to the base year 2012 that are excluded in 
the regression, this implies that the value of ROA was higher in 2009 compared to the year of 
2012. The industry dummy “industry 1” is significant at the 5% significance level and has a 
negative effect on ROA compared to the other nine industries, with a coefficient of -0.072 this 
implies that the firms in the industry 1 had a lower value of their ROA compared to the firms in 
the other 9 industries. 
 
5.5 Test 5: Tobin’s Q and ROA with Founder Family CEO and Family CEO 
Both the regressions of Tobin's Q and ROA with the independent variables of family and 
founding family CEO have the problem with only one observation. It is only the firm Hennes & 
Mauritz that have a CEO with connections to a founding family that are among the 25 largest 
owners or a family that owns at least 25% of the equity in the firm or have 25% of the voting 
rights. In the case of Hennes & Mauritz the founding family still has an extremely large impact 
on the firm. Because of the lack of observations we cannot get any useful information from the 
regressions, for the regression result for CEO; see the tables 1.5-1.8 in appendix. 
 
5.6 Summary empirical results 
Our empirical results implies that the null hypotheses for Tobin’s Q can´t be rejected since none 
of the tests with Tobin’s Q as the dependant variable are significant. We cannot say that family 
and founding-family has an effect on Tobin’s Q. The empirical result also implies that the null 
hypothesis for ROA only can be rejected in the case of Founding-family but we cannot say that 
family has an effect on ROA. In the case of the effect of Family-CEO and Founder-Family-CEO 
on Tobin’s Q and ROA we cannot draw any conclusions since the sample is too small.  
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5.7 Discussion 
5.7.1 Reliability 
The data have been collected from the databases Orbis and Data Stream that include information 
about the firm’s financial results. The information about the firm's CEO´s and owning structures 
have been gathered from “Ägarna och Makten I Sveriges börsföretag” written by Fristedt et al, 
2009 and the actuality of this information has been controlled for at the firm’s own websites.  
5.7.2 Validity 
Do the chosen parameters measure the values we are interested in in the right way? To 
strengthen the validity of this study we has chosen to examine two different dependent 
parameters, the Tobin’s Q used in Oreland (2007) that is a market-oriented measure and ROA 
used in Andersson and Reeb (2003) that is an accounting based measure. The usage of some of 
the parameters that several of the earlier studies have been using is increasing the validity of our 
study. 
5.7.3  Systematic errors 
Because a population sample is not an exact reflection of the population the result based on the 
sample may not be representative for the total population.  Some of the errors that is possible to 
appear is processing error, error of measurement and cover errors. 
  
The question we need to ask ourselves is if our sample from the OMX 60 is a true sample of our 
population of Swedish firms listed on the Stock Exchange. One of the problems that have been 
encountered for is the excluding of banks and the investment firms. This is the case where 
government regulations could affect firm performance that can cause problems when 
calculations of Tobin’s Q. Excluding this firms may have resulted in some cover errors. 
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6. Conclusion  
The purpose of this thesis has been to find evidence of a “family-effect” on the firm performance 
and firm valuation measures. The family-effect was measured by Family firm, Founder-family 
firm and if the CEO are controlled by the families. We have accomplished the purpose of the 
thesis but we failed to test the effect of a family and founding-family controlled CEO because of 
the lack of observations on family controlled CEO in our sample. Even though our data 
contained about 50% family-controlled-firms there where only one (1) firm that also controlled 
the position as CEO.  
 
The main findings in our empirical results imply that Founding-family has a positive effect on 
Return on Assets (ROA). The conclusion is that the result from the regression differs distinctly 
from the value by which we measure the firm’s performances. We can observe that by using the 
book value of return on assets in the regressions instead of the market value of Tobin´s q, it 
results in a significance of the founding-family effect. 
 
7. Analysis 
Our concern has been with the previous studies contradictory results because even though the 
studies have had similar purposes and hypothesis their empirical results implies different 
“family-effects” on performance and valuation measures. As described in section 3.2 Earlier 
studies, Anderson and Reeb (2003), Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Villalonga and Amit 
(2004) find a positive family-effect on firm performance and firm valuation and Oreland (2007) 
find a negative family-effect. Their contradictory results could be an effect of the different data 
samples since the sample of Oreland (2007) is from Swedish firms and the other samples were 
collected from the US and Continental Europe.  
 
The data in our study where collected from Swedish firms but still our result is contradictory to 
that of Oreland’s. One reason for the difference in our results is that we have different time 
periods and our time period (2008-2012) consisted the years of the financial crisis. Our result 
could be a sign, although not tested for in this study, of that founding-family firms may have 
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managed to deal with the financial crisis in a better way than non-founding family-firms. 
Another more certain answer to the question why our result differ from the result of Oreland’s, 
may be that Oreland has based his search on a larger sample than ours and has also only studied 
the effect on Tobin’s Q. The larger sample may have an effect on his opportunity to get a more 
accurate result. At the same time he also have some additional control variables in comparison to 
what we have in our regression, this is also something that can have an effect on the result. The 
above-mentioned factors could be the reason why he found significance of family control on 
Tobin’s Q that we fail to find.         
 
The difference in the significance of family effect in the regressions with ROA and Tobin’s Q is 
something that we find interesting. The question is why this difference between the performance 
and valuing measures is occurring. The obvious differences are that the two performance values 
indicate two different ways to measure the performance versus value of a firm. One reason may 
be that an underlying variable is affecting the way that the dependent variable is affected by a 
family-firm. What is it that makes the book value more affected by a family structure than the 
market value? This, and the possibility that family-controlled firms have handled the finance 
crisis differently than non-family firms, would be interesting to explore in further studies. 
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9. Appendix 
Table 1.1: Correlation matrix Tobin’s q and family firm 
Correlation on Family, ROA, liability, lnSize (obs=199) 
 Fam ROA Liability lnSize  
Fam 1     
ROA 0,1649 1    
Liability 0,0528 0,1013 1   
lnSize 0,1589 0,3325 0,4621 1  
Table 6 shows the correlation between the variables Family, ROA, liability and lnsize. Family is 
a dummy variable measuring if the firm is a family firm, 1 if a family or individual own >25% of 
the votes or shares. ROA is Return on assets, liability is calculated by total debt divided by total 
assets and lnsize is the natural logarithm of the total asset of the firm. There are 199 firm-year 
observations from 2008 to 2012 collected from 40 firms in the OMX60.  
 
Table 1.2: Correlation matrix Tobin’s q and founder family 
Correlation on Founding Family, ROA, Liability, lnSize (obs=199) 
  Founding fam ROA Liability lnSize   
Founding Fam 1     
ROA 0,2823 1       
Liability -0,0394 0,1013 1   
lnSize -0,0056 0,3325 0,4621 1   
Table 8 shows the correlation between the variables Founding-Family, ROA, liability and lnsize. 
Founding-Family is a dummy variable measuring if the firm is a family firm if the founder or its 
family are among the 25 largest shareholders and possesses board seat(s). ROA is Return on 
assets, liability is calculated by total debt divided by total assets and lnsize is the natural 
logarithm of the total asset of the firm. There are 199 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2012 
collected from 40 firms in the OMX60.  
 
Table 1.3: Correlation matrix ROA and family 
Correlation on Family, Liability, lnSize (obs=199) 
       Fam      Liability    lnSize     
 Fam 1     
Liability 0,0528 1       
lnSize 0,1589 0,4621 1   
Table 10 shows the correlation between the variables Family, liability and lnsize. Family is a 
dummy variable measuring if the firm is a family firm, 1 if a family or individual own >25% of 
the votes or shares. ROA is Return on assets, liability is calculated by total debt divided by total 
assets and lnsize is the natural logarithm of the total asset of the firm. There are 199 firm-year 
observations from 2008 to 2012 collected from 40 firms in the OMX60.  
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Table 1.4: Correlation matrix ROA and founder family 
Correlation on Founding family, Liability, lnSize (obs=199) 
  Founding fam Liability lnSize     
Founding fam 1     
Liability -0,0394 1       
lnSize -0,0056 0,4621 1   
Table 12 shows the correlation between the variables Founding-Family, liability and lnsize. 
Founding-Family is a dummy variable measuring if the founder or its family are among the 25 
largest shareholders and possesses board seat(s). ROA is Return on assets, liability is calculated 
by total debt divided by total assets and lnsize is the natural logarithm of the total asset of the 
firm. There are 199 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2012 collected from 40 firms in the 
OMX60.  
 
Table 1.5 Regression Founding family CEO, lnTobin´s Q 
Linear regression lnTobin´s Q, Founding CEO, Liability, lnSize, ROA, y11, y10, 
y09, y08, industry 1 (cluster) 
Number of obs=199 
F ( 9, 39) =  - 
Prob> F =  - 
R-squared = 0,4878 
Root MSE  = 0,66263 
     lnTobin´s Q Coef. Robust Std.Err. t P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Intervall]  
Founding CEO 1,524395 0,48216 3,16 0,003 0,549134 2,499656   
Liability -0,48945 1,086736 -0,45 0,655 -2,68758 1,708679 
 
lnSize -0,24785 0,076151 -3,25 0,002 -0,40188 -938181   
ROA 1,100072 0,836945 1,31 0,196 -0,59281 2,792953 
 
y11 -0,0882 0,063752 -1,38 0,174 -0,21715 0,040756   
y10 0,08012 0,605719 1,32 0,194 -0,0424 0,202638 
 
y09 -0,24424 0,091822 -2,66 0,011 -0,42997 -0,05851   
y08 -0,73303 0,143267 -5,12 0 -1,02282 -0,44325 
 
Industry 1 -0,034 0,193986 -0,18 0,862 -0,42638 0,358371   
cons 3,914728 0,709374 5,52 0 2,479884 5,349572   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
Table 1.6 Regression Family CEO, lnTobin´s Q 
Linear regression lnTobin´s Q, Fam CEO, Liability, lnSize, ROA, y11, y10, y09, 
y08, industry 1 (cluster) 
Number of obs=199 
F ( 9, 39) =  - 
Prob> F =  - 
R-squared = 0,4878 
Root MSE  = 0,66263 
     lnTobin´s Q Coef. 
Robust 
Std.Err. 
t P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Intervall]  
 Fam CEO 1,524395 0,48216 3,16 0,003 0,549134 2,499656   
Liability -0,48945 1,086736 -0,45 0,655 -2,68758 1,708679 
 
lnSize -0,24785 0,076151 -3,25 0,002 -0,40188 -938181   
ROA 1,100072 0,836945 1,31 0,196 -0,59281 2,792953 
 
y11 -0,0882 0,063752 -1,38 0,174 -0,21715 0,040756   
y10 0,08012 0,605719 1,32 0,194 -0,0424 0,202638 
 
y09 -0,24424 0,091822 -2,66 0,011 -0,42997 -0,05851   
y08 -0,73303 0,143267 -5,12 0 -1,02282 -0,44325 
 
Industry 1 -0,034 0,193986 -0,18 0,862 -0,42638 0,358371   
cons 3,914728 0,709374 5,52 0 2,479884 5,349572   
 
Table 1.7 Regression, Founding family CEO, ROA 
Linear regression ROA, Founding CEO, Liability, lnSize, y11, y10, y09, y08, 
industry 1 (cluster) 
Number of obs=199 
F ( 7, 39) =  - 
Prob> F =  - 
R-squared = 0,2458 
Root MSE  = 0,15708 
       ROA Coef. Robust Std.Err. t P>|t| 
     [95% Conf. 
Intervall]  
Found CEO 0,298732 0,054093 5,52 0 0,189318 0,408145   
Liability 0,08006 0,101984 0,79 0,437 -0,12623 0,286342 
 
lnSize 0,023496 0,026526 0,89 0,381 -0,03016 0,07715   
y11 0,010276 0,016837 0,61 0,545 -0,02378 0,044331 
 
y10 0,002418 0,015076 0,16 0,873 -0,02808 0,032913   
y09 0,053114 0,01649 3,22 0,003 0,01976 0,086468 
 
y08 0,017791 0,028038 0,63 0,529 -0,03892 0,074502   
industry 1 -0,0814 0,039313 
-
2,07 
0,045 -0,16092 -0,00188 
 
cons -0,26543 0,35941 
-
0,74 
0,465 -0,99241 0,461542   
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Table 1.8 Regression, Family-CEO, ROA 
Linear regression ROA, Family CEO, Liability, lnSize, y11, y10, y09, y08, industry 
1 (cluster) 
Number of obs=199 
F ( 7, 39) =  - 
Prob> F =  - 
R-squared = 0,2458 
Root MSE  = 0,15708 
       ROA Coef. Robust Std.Err. t P>|t| 
     [95% Conf. 
Intervall]  
Fam CEO 0,298732 0,054093 5,52 0 0,189318 0,408145   
Liability 0,08006 0,101984 0,79 0,437 -0,12623 0,286342 
 
lnSize 0,023496 0,026526 0,89 0,381 -0,03016 0,07715   
y11 0,010276 0,016837 0,61 0,545 -0,02378 0,044331 
 
y10 0,002418 0,015076 0,16 0,873 -0,02808 0,032913   
y09 0,053114 0,01649 3,22 0,003 0,01976 0,086468 
 
y08 0,017791 0,028038 0,63 0,529 -0,03892 0,074502   
industry 1 -0,0814 0,039313 -2,07 0,045 -0,16092 -0,00188 
 
cons -0,26543 0,35941 -0,74 0,465 -0,99241 0,461542   
 
